1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT				
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON				
3	OREGON ADVOCACY CENTER,)				
4	et al.,) Plaintiffs,	Case No. 3:02-cv-00339-MO			
5	v.) case No. 3.02-cv-00339-NO			
6	BOBBY MINK, et al.,				
7	Defendants.				
8	JAROD BOWMAN, et al.,				
9	Plaintiffs,	Case No. 3:21-cv-01637-MO			
10	v.))			
11	DELORES MATTEUCCI, et al.,)				
12	Defendants.				
13	LEGACY HEALTH SYSTEM, et al.,				
14	Plaintiffs,) Case No. 6:22-cv-01460-MO			
15	v.)				
16	PATRICK ALLEN,) March 31, 2023)			
17	Defendant.	Portland, Oregon			
18	,				
19					
20	Oral Argument				
21	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS				
22	BEFORE THE HONORABLE MICHAEL W. MOSMAN				
23	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SENIOR JUDGE				
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(PROCEEDINGS)1 2 (March 31, 2023; 1:33 p.m.) * * * * * * * * * 3 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: We are here today for oral 4 5 argument in Case No. 3:02-cv-339-MO, Oregon Advocacy Center, et al. versus Mink, et. al; member Case No. 3:21-cv-1637-MO; and 6 7 6:22-cv-1460-MO. Counsel, please state your name for the record. 8 9 MS. COOPER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. My name is 10 Emily Cooper, and I represent organizational plaintiff Disability Rights Oregon. 11 12 THE COURT: Thank you. 13 MS. SCOTT: Carla Scott for defendant. MS. POTTER: Sheila Potter for defendants. 14 15 MR. GARZA: Keith Garza for Oregon amici circuit 16 court judges. MS. VETTO: And I'm Jane Vetto, here on behalf of 17 18 Marion County, also nonparty Marion County Sheriff's Office. 19 THE COURT: Thank you all for being here. 20 Dr. Pinals, you're here listening by audio; is that 21 right? 22 DR. PINALS: Yes, it is, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 24 Let me give my tentative thoughts -- and there's a 25 lot of question in my mind about this, so feel free to jump in

and explain where I've missed something.

The parties are familiar with the underlying facts that gave rise to this hearing today. The September 1 order requires OSH to discharge people at certain time periods if competency has not been restored and enough time has passed.

My own tentative view upon review particularly of what the sheriffs have written is that the September 1 order has a sort of a procedural or you might even think of as a mechanical gap in it. It contemplates -- really the only thing it says is that there will be a certain period of notice, currently 30 days, soon I guess to be 60, and then that the hospital is required to discharge the patient pursuant to this order.

What it doesn't say anything about is who will come get him or her and under what auspices. I'm confident that the understanding of people involved to the point of me promulgating this order was that law enforcement of some kind -- typically a sheriff's office from the committing county -- would come get the person and return them to the county, and the county would then have to decide what to do next. I appreciate -- I'm sure that's not always clear, but I do very much appreciate that that leaves counties sometimes with no great choices. But that's sort of the scheme that was contemplated.

So we have now from Marion County certain people -- I

think we're down to three -- who are supposed to be discharged pursuant to the September 1 order, probably supposed to be picked up by Marion County Sheriff's Office and returned to Marion County, and that's not happening. And it's not happening for a variety of reasons, including the possibility that Marion County Sheriff's Office would get in serious trouble with their own courts and judges if they were to do that, and also the possibility raised currently informally that the director of OSH would be in trouble with Marion County judges if discharge occurred, although I don't foresee a situation where discharge would occur if nobody was there to pick somebody up, since they arrive at OSH in custody.

The relief sought, if I understand it correctly, is sort of two-fold: a restraining order requiring Marion County Sheriff, nonparties, to come and receive the three people to be discharged and return them to the committing county, Marion County, and some idea, perhaps, that if that fails, that there would be contempt of court for not doing so.

The gap that I think I see in the order is that it doesn't really tell anybody -- it doesn't tell any sheriff's office, for example, that they must come get a person about to be discharged or really spell out in any way what is supposed to happen next. And so that leaves me with the tentative view that before I can really restrain a nonparty, it ought to be clearer that the order requires the person, the entity to do

what I'm about to order them to do, as opposed to being silent on the subject.

Again, so my tentative view is that the most that can happen to advance the ball forward today for the implementation of the September 1 order -- which I am committed to, despite its sometimes painful consequences, because I believe it's required by the Constitution -- the best I can do to advance the ball towards its implementation is to amend the order to make clear what currently isn't clear, and make clear that about which it's currently silent as to what are the responsibilities of the committing county upon discharge, amend the order, and then start the clock running all over again. That is, allow the amended order to do whatever it is it's next going to do if I amend it -- that is, provide new notice and a new opportunity to now comply with the more specific commands of an amended order or not.

We may be right back where we are right now in the future or may not -- I don't know the answer to that -- but my belief is that because none of this is spelled out in my September 1 order, that I'm not on solid footing to order compliance absent an amended order that makes what must be complied with clearer than the current version of the order does.

So that's a sort of a long-winded explanation of my tentative thoughts. I'll start with you, Ms. Cooper.

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MS. COOPER: Your Honor, respectfully, plaintiffs don't believe there's a mechanical gap. If you look at the county briefing on page 4, they cite to a state statute 206.010 subsection 3. And that is a state statute that requires county sheriffs to execute orders of the courts of justice or of judicial officers, which includes this Court. And if you look at Lieutenant Ramsey's testimony in his declaration, the Marion County Sheriff's Office did get notice of this Court's September 2022 order, and indeed the county sheriffs -- and I'm quoting -- "incorporated these shortened timelines into their tracking sheets," and have transported 56 individuals from Oregon State Hospital, end quote, again pursuant to this September 2022 order. The county sheriff's office stopped complying with

this order only when a Marion County court issued a modified order prohibiting transport. And again quoting from Lieutenant Ramsey, "MCSO could not conduct transport without being in contempt of state court."

And so it was only through the threat of contempt that this county sheriff was put in a bind. Do we continue to comply with this Court's order or the committing court's? And so I think while we can all appreciate that the sheriff's office was put into a very awkward position of choosing between compliance with this Court's order and the committing court, what is concerning is that it is still county courts that are

challenging this Court's authority to issue remedial actions to comply with your very clear order requiring timely transport.

THE COURT: 206.010 does, in fact, require compliance with court orders, including federal court orders. I guess my fundamental question is where does -- and I can appreciate how this worked across a number of cases prior to MCSO being at risk of being in violation of a state court's order. It worked prior to that on this sort of understanding that we all had about what would make sense to happen next.

What I'm asking, I guess, is where does one go in the September 1 order to find that this Court is ordering the sheriff's office to come pick up people upon discharge?

MS. COOPER: Your Honor, if I may, I can point you directly to where in your September order.

THE COURT: I can help you. The only possibility is paragraph (3)d.

MS. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor, I agree.

And, again, the county sheriffs acknowledged the limitations imposed by them and they included that in their transport orders.

THE COURT: I don't mean to quibble with your point, which is a good one. It's just that people sometimes have an understanding of something until they don't. But if pressed, as opposed to just adopting it as a matter of practice, if pressed -- and that's what this hearing would be about -- my

question would be if you want me to -- well, let's start with contempt, although we're not quite there yet, but let's start with contempt. If you want me to hold somebody in contempt for failing to obey an order of mine, then I've got to find in my order where Multnomah County Sheriff's Office, for example, is failing to obey an order of mine, and I struggle to see that in paragraph (3)d.

MS. COOPER: So what I'm looking at --

THE COURT: What are they doing that fails to obey anything in the September 1 order?

MS. COOPER: It's the language in your order, Your Honor, that says, "No later than March 15, 2023, patients currently admitted at Oregon State Hospital who have exceeded the length of restoration set forth in this order shall be discharged from their restoration and from the hospital."

Now, Your Honor, I understand what you're saying, that there's no language about the obligation for the county sheriff to transport. This is where I go back to state statute. And the county in their own briefing acknowledged that it's the sheriff's obligation to do so. So if you take that language from your order and then the statute, we don't believe again there's any mechanical gap.

THE COURT: Again, so I'm not trying to discount your point, but I do want you for a moment to set aside what the county did. That is, what they did was they read the

September 1 order and they understood it not just by way of being nice, but under 206.010, they understood it to obligate them to show up and pick up people from OSH and bring them back to Marion County.

But if we set that to one side, that then understanding of what they were obligated to do, and just looked at what, in fact, in my order makes them do that, then I guess from what you've told me, you've read (3)d. now and (3)f., what you've told me is that there isn't anything textual in the order that commands MCSO to come get these folks, right?

MS. COOPER: That's correct.

THE COURT: It's implicit, I guess, in the structure of the entire order?

MS. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor, coupled with state statute.

THE COURT: Coupled with state statute. All the state statute does is say if federal courts order you to do something, you have to do it. But I'm not asking that question. I'm asking have I, in fact, ordered them to do it. And your answer is not textual. Your answer is, well, everyone thought you had and understood it that way until they were threatened otherwise. Right?

MS. COOPER: That's correct. I think the sheriff's office was put in a bind. Which court do I comply with?

THE COURT: All right. I kept you engaged while you

were handed a note. Is there something you want to add?

MS. COOPER: No. The note is simply that I think we would take your direction if you feel like more clarity is needed and more notice would put all parties on clear notice that your injunction requires timely transport by the entities responsible for providing transport.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Scott, Ms. Potter, anything you wish to add to this discussion?

MS. SCOTT: Just briefly, Your Honor. I think that filling in the gap would be helpful for all parties, just an order as you just described to the sheriff's office. It is the practice that is followed in all discharges for aid-and-assist patients.

I did want to correct a fact. There are only two remaining patients at the hospital whose time is up who can't be discharged because of the sheriffs declining to transport them, but we are having down the pipeline numerous new orders from Marion County ordering that committed aid-and-assist patients shall only return to the jail upon court order that defendant is able or never able to aid and assist. So this is an ongoing problem. I do think a gap-filling order making clear what the responsibilities are would be helpful. The hospital here just wants to comply with this Court's order and the state court orders, and knowing that it must first comply

under the Supremacy Clause with this Court's order.

THE COURT: This is sort of in weeds on state law, though. That's something I'm not familiar with to the degree I need to be. So I have assumed -- I think we all did -- that it would typically be in this setting. If anyone was to come pick up a discharged patient under (3)d., it would be the county sheriff's office.

MS. SCOTT: That's correct.

THE COURT: Is that set in stone or could it be other possibilities?

MS. SCOTT: It's my understanding that there are not other possibilities. I know in the briefing it was suggested that potentially the Oregon State Police might be able to do the transport, but Oregon statutes do not give OSP the authority to transport patients from the State Hospital. Their statutory authority is very limited. I would be happy to provide the Court with further briefing, but currently Oregon law does not allow OSP to transport the aid-and-assist patients.

THE COURT: If the investigating agency for the underlying offense is, say, Salem Police Department, does that mean that Salem Police Department could go pick up someone committed to OSH and return them to Marion County or not?

MS. SCOTT: We haven't looked at that particular question, but I would be happy to provide supplemental briefing

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               THE COURT:
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               MS. POTTER:
                            I think we would potentially be in a
     situation in which the Marion County Sheriff's Office would
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     still have been ordered not to accept someone back into the
     jail, which they also control. And I don't know that, but --
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               THE COURT: Because they do have sole control over
     the jail, right?
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               MS. POTTER: I believe that's correct.
                           Compared to Oregon State Police or Salem
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               THE COURT:
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               MS. POTTER:
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               THE COURT: All right. So that's a big part of why
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     it has typically been the county, because they're returning to
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     a county facility run by the sheriff's office.
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               MS. POTTER:
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               THE COURT:
                           Thank you.
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               Ms. Vetto, I'll start with you.
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               MS. VETTO:
                           Thank you, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Is your microphone on?
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               MS. VETTO: Would it be easier --
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               THE COURT:
                           That's fine. Just pull it closer
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THE COURT: I'm sorry, I'm going to pause you there.

I hate to interrupt you.

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MS. VETTO: Is this better?

THE COURT: Much better. Thank you.

MS. VETTO: First of all I want to say thank you for giving us the opportunity to respond to this motion today. The sheriff's office is very concerned about this -- the whole county is -- and really opposes the relief that the plaintiffs requested in their briefing.

I guess the first kind of question is for us, we are nonparties to this case, and the order that you entered on September 1st is directed specifically to the entities that the attorneys here represent. And so as the Court noted, there is nothing in here that talks about the sheriff's offices in general, who transports, reports, anything like that. So in the absence of that, the sheriff's office has to look at what they are ordered to do. And in Oregon, when a circuit court commits an adult in custody who needs to be -- receive restoration services at the State Hospital, the circuit court orders them under a form order that's prepared by the DOJ to transport that individual to the hospital and then pick them That is the only thing that they are legally required to up. There is no state statute that requires transport by do. counties, by county sheriffs -- nothing. The only thing that requires them -- the only thing in the words of the plaintiffs,

that they're charged to do, the only thing that charges them is this order that they're seeking to have you vacate.

THE COURT: So when you say "transport," under what authority does MCSO transport prisoners from circuit court to OSH in the first place?

MS. VETTO: Under the same committing order.

THE COURT: The committing order is what gives the sheriff authority to transport from jail to OSH?

MS. VETTO: Exactly.

THE COURT: There was a time not very long ago, right, where MCSO was under the understanding, at least -- perhaps you'll tell me that was mistaken, but it was under the understanding, was it not, that this Court's September 1 order required and therefore authorized MCSO to pick people up who had been discharged and return them to Marion County, right?

MS. VETTO: So our --

THE COURT: First just tell me if that's right. Is that right?

MS. VETTO: I can't speak for how they understood it.

My understanding of the order was that the treatment -- the

treatment guideline -- or the treatment times would be

shortened, and after the required timelines had -- treatment

times had been met, that those individuals would be discharged

and we would revert back to the circuit court order for

transport.

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THE COURT: Let me ask it this way. There were a number of people who under the September 1 order, particularly paragraph (3)d. and (3)f., had maxed out their time and had been by this Court ordered to be discharged whom MCSO went and picked up, right, and returned them to the county? They did. And I --MS. VETTO: THE COURT: They didn't do that out of the kindness of their hearts. MS. VETTO: I believe they did that through a circuit I can check on that, but I believe they received court order. an order from the court to do that. THE COURT: All right. And then when they both quit receiving such orders and, in fact, were ordered not to, that practice stopped? MS. VETTO: So it hasn't stopped. You know, that's the other kind of -- there are a couple of factual inaccuracies in the declaration that the plaintiffs base this motion on. One of them is that the Marion County Sheriff's Office has stopped transporting. That is not the case. The most recent transport from the jail was Monday. They keep doing it when they're ordered to do it, but in --THE COURT: You mean -- because we have to be

specific about what order is ordering them to do it, you mean

MS. VETTO: Even more specifically than that.

orders from the circuit court to go and bring people back?

the original committing order hasn't been changed. In the two circumstances that we're talking about here, the circuit court went in and specifically amended the original committing order to prohibit transfer by the sheriff's office until -- unless they provided the Court with updated progress reports. And my reading of this doesn't prohibit that either. So there's only two instances that I'm aware of. There was a third instance that Mr. Wehr talked about that was a little bit different. In that case the district attorney filed an unopposed motion to keep the adult in custody at the State Hospital. It was --

THE COURT: So I understand better, meaning unopposed by the criminal defense attorney?

MS. VETTO: Exactly, Your Honor.

And immediately thereafter, the State -- the jail was notified the Court had entered that motion or had approved that motion, and then following that, right after that, they were informed that this individual had been moved into community restoration and then discharged from the State Hospital. So in his declaration, Mr. Wehr says, well, Marion County isn't picking up this first individual. He's not at the State Hospital anymore.

There are two individuals --

THE COURT: Can I follow up just a minute on that just so I understand better?

MS. VETTO: Yes.

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the DA or sometimes sua sponte?

THE COURT: So are you telling me that there are returns -- that is, people being discharged from OSP being returned to Marion County -- being conducted by MCSO pursuant to commitment orders that also include authority from the court, the circuit court, to return people? MS. VETTO: Exactly. THE COURT: And then only when those are amended is there no transport? MS. VETTO: Exactly. THE COURT: And it's always that they -- is it invariably the practice that the commitment order includes authorization to return upon discharge unless it's amended otherwise? MS. VETTO: So the form order is attached to Lieutenant Ramsey's declaration for the Court to review. That is the standard language that -- for all these commitment orders, and to my knowledge, it has only been changed twice. THE COURT: So in terms of a contest, so to speak, between a Supremacy Clause contest between an order from this Court and a circuit court order, that has only arisen when the circuit court amends its original commitment order to disallow return? MS. VETTO: Yes. THE COURT: And that has been always upon motion of

MS. VETTO: I do not know.

THE COURT: And those amendments -- I know the ones in front of me you suggest have a certain aspect to them, but do they invariably simply disallow returns until a progress report is filed or are they different from each other?

MS. VETTO: On page 5 of our brief, we actually cite to the amendment language. They're identical to both and they say: "The defendant may not be returned from OSH absent an order from the committing court. The committing court may issue an order allowing transport upon receipt of a current progress report, as contemplated by ORS 161.371, detailing the defendant's fitness to proceed."

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Those are my questions. Anything else you want to add?

MS. VETTO: I guess the only other thing I want to talk about is -- and the plaintiffs raised this in their brief. They said that we should be -- the Court should take this action against a nonparty, should enter this really extraordinary relief because the requirements of FR 65 have been met. And I won't rehash my brief. We do not believe that they have been met. We're clearly not a legal entity or legally tied in any way to the State Hospital, and we're not in active concert with them. In fact, I think what they're saying is we haven't done anything. And there is federal case law

that says to meet the second prong of FRCP 65, mere inaction by a nonparty doesn't meet that aiding and abetting statute. So I don't think they've met the requirements under FRCP 65.

THE COURT: Is it your theory that it's impossible to reach a point where MCSO could be enjoined to return because simply not returning is always going to be inaction only?

MS. VETTO: I would say under these particular circumstances, where we've been prohibited to take an action, yes.

And I think the other thing is, Your Honor, even if you were to find that the requirements of FRCP 65 have been met, I think the Court is still required to fashion a remedy that's the least intrusive possible. And in this particular circumstance, there's a lot less intrusive things that can happen besides putting our sheriff in between competing and conflicting court orders. First of all, the State Hospital could do these progress reports for these individuals and notify the Court so that they could be safely placed either back in the community or into our jail.

The second thing is that contrary to the State's contention, there's absolutely no state law that requires us to transport. The statutes are silent to it. So if they're arguing that somehow we can do it, they can do it too. They have an entire police force. They could also --

THE COURT: They have to transport them to a facility

managed by your client, right?

MS. VETTO: I don't think that's the issue. I think we would have to accept them because they're still under a pretrial detention -- order of detention.

THE COURT: Well, I want to be careful about this.

Are you saying that even today that could happen? That if by some miracle, you know, we found another law enforcement agency that would do the transport, are you saying that today, given the nature of the amended commitment orders, if one of these two people showed up being transported by the galactic law enforcement agency, you would be obligated to place them in your facility?

MS. VETTO: I think my client would be mad at me for saying this, but I think that there's certainly an argument to that, yeah.

THE COURT: Is it also your client's position that that would not violate the amended commitment order to do so?

MS. VETTO: I don't think it would, although I don't know if the Court would agree with that. I think that the -- I think actually what the amended order says is that they shall not discharge, but if they decide to discharge, then I think there's nothing in there that says we can't accept a person under pretrial. We just can't transport them.

I do think there's some other things that they can do. They haven't exhausted --

THE COURT: Can I ask just a practice question then?

MS. VETTO: Yes.

THE COURT: Has it been invariably the practice across years of time that when for any reason there's a discharge of a patient from OSH who is under an existing commitment order of any kind -- meaning commitment order or just custody order -- that it's the sheriff's office who goes and gets them from OSH?

MS. VETTO: I would say if they're picking them up under this order, yes, unless there was --

THE COURT: Separate from this order, what if they're just -- have competency restored? Who goes and gets them?

MS. VETTO: I did not look into that. I can.

I think the last thing that we haven't talked about, that the State hasn't talked about is that they haven't -- the plaintiffs have not exhausted their remedies under state law. I mean, if they object to a state court order, they can move to quash it. They can mandamus it. There are a lot of things that are less intrusive that they can get to try to set this aside that doesn't require this really extraordinary relief against a nonparty that is really untenable, that puts that party in a untenable situation.

So I guess we ask that you deny this motion, and that if you do fashion relief, that it be the least intrusive alternative available.

Thank you. 1 2 Thank you. THE COURT: 3 I just want to follow up on one last thought to make sure again that I'm thinking about this in the right way. 4 5 When you say that they haven't exhausted their state court remedies, what I'm asking is are you maintaining that 6 7 there literally is some sort of exhaustion requirement, or is it just that failure to do that shows a failure to use less 8 9 intrusive means of accomplishing your goals? 10 I think the latter. I think maybe MS. VETTO: 11 "exhaust" was an overstatement, but they certainly haven't 12 explored them before coming to federal court. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 13 14 Mr. Garza. 15 MR. GARZA: Thank you, Your Honor. Just --16 THE COURT: Same request. If you wouldn't mind getting that microphone close. 17 18 MR. GARZA: Thank you, Your Honor. 19 I'm just here to answer any questions or concerns the 20 Court might have. 21 I feel like it's been helpful so far, THE COURT: 22 unless you have something you specifically want to add. 23 MR. GARZA: No. 24 THE COURT: Do you wish to respond in any way, 25 Ms. Cooper?

MS. COOPER: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It is my view that this gap in the order disqualifies this case for the remedies sought. I feel like it's not clear enough who had to do what when for me to find anyone in contempt or me to order by restraining order anyone to do something they clearly should have done and are not doing. So I deny the requested relief for today.

I am ordering the parties, and if willing, the litigants in front of me here today, to submit to the Court in one week's time a proposed amendment to the September 1 order that fills this gap, and it needs to fill the gap -- there are three issues to sort out, not all of them susceptible to solution by a mere textual amendment, but it's worth a shot.

One is, and that is that the order should say what it now doesn't say, and that is that when the moment of truth arrives that section (3)d. contemplates, then who is obligated to do what next. And I think that's fairly simple with just one big issue that I'm unable to sort out today that you can either tell me you sort out or tell me you don't know the answer to and I'll rule on it, and that is if we were certain that the person who had to come to OSH and get a person being discharged under (3)d. and return that person to the committing county was the committing county's sheriff's office, then the textual amendment I think is pretty simple to write. What's up in the air is does it have to be the sheriff.

And that has -- there's two ways to answer that question. One is by statutory authority, which may be silent on the matter, and the other is pragmatically. That is, if there's no one else that really can do it, or if it doesn't make any sense at all for some, you know, strange law enforcement agency to show up at this sheriff's jail with somebody, then I'm willing to do the most pragmatic thing if it's the only right answer. So that's one question: Who is supposed to show up and do what in order to effectuate (3)d. and (3)f.?

The second is also I think worth thinking about as a textual amendment, but it's also just worth thinking about, and that is what obligation, if any, should the September 1 order place on OSH to meet the request, at least in this case, by circuit court judges for a predischarge progress report.

And you know the argument. The argument is if you're going to send this person back to us and we have choices to make, choices that could include community care but might also include involuntary commitment for dangerousness or something like that, then we would like to know OSH's professional opinion about where this person stands. So that's something to think about, whether it gets folded into an amendment to the order or not.

The third is not a textual amendment. It's just one on which I'll appreciate your further input by briefing or

otherwise, and that is does the requirement to use the least intrusive means possible impose some obligation in this very situation to seek state court relief.

Actually, thinking this through out loud, one week isn't sufficient time. How much time would be needed to both propose textual amendments and supply any additional briefing on the remaining issues?

I'll start with you, Ms. Cooper.

MS. COOPER: Your Honor, I feel that the first is achievable in a week. I think regarding the other two, I think in particular the -- what I'll call the care coordination requirement, that is something the parties plan on addressing at -- during mediation with Judge Beckerman, and I think it is critical.

THE COURT: So put it past those two mediation dates?

MS. COOPER: Correct.

THE COURT: Into May or what?

MS. COOPER: We can confer, but I think into May makes sense from plaintiff's position.

THE COURT: Do you agree?

MS. SCOTT: I do agree. But with respect to the obligation to pursue state court remedies, I would just point out that neither the hospital or plaintiffs are parties to these nontransport orders, so I don't believe that there is a vehicle to appeal those orders by either of the parties in the

main Bowman cases.

THE COURT: Then it will be easy to provide your brief on this question.

MS. SCOTT: So we can do that quickly. That was my point.

MS. POTTER: I think on the side of a week.

MS. SCOTT: The second point is to what extent can, should, and would the hospital be able to provide progress notes to the committing court. But we are seeing a whole slew of new orders that don't require a progress report but simply say -- in their original commitment orders that say, I'm committing this person to the hospital. They may not return until I, state court judge, finds they are able or unable. So that is a new thing. It's not before the Court today, but it is separate and apart from the requirement for a progress report.

THE COURT: I understand that by not granting the relief requested today, that will back people up. That's unfortunate but, in my view, unavoidable at this time. So we'll just work as quickly as possible to create a path forward that doesn't allow this logjam.

I want to be clear. If I thought the order were clearer, then I have no question in my mind -- in my mind about the application of the Supremacy Clause here, none whatsoever.

And so it's just a question of how to do two things that I

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think are missing. One is to make the order clearer about who is obligated to do what; and two, to at least explore the possibility that for this particular subpart of the relief requested, I'm ordering the least intrusive means possible. I've already made that finding on a more overarching basis, but I think it has to be applied somewhat differently to this particular issue. But other than that, you know, we've gone down this road already, and I'm clear in my views of what the Supremacy Clause means and doesn't mean with respect to competing orders here. For your two clients -- I'll talk to you, Mr. Garza, first. Your clients' fundamental position has been that the order should be vacated, and so I'm not sure your client is in a position -- clients, I guess, in a position to participate meaningfully in amending an order they wish to see vacated. Is there any point to your participation? MR. GARZA: Well, I don't want to get into what's been going on in the mediation, but -- as Ms. Cooper indicated --I mean in this particular piece of the THE COURT: mediation, just this issue for today's purposes. MR. GARZA: Well, I think numbers two and three that you indicated are matters that my clients would be interested in participating in.

THE COURT: Same question, Ms. Vetto.

MS. VETTO: Yes, I think that's absolutely true.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. VETTO: I guess I would say that if there is some criteria about a discharge progress report, I have a feeling that's going to take away the whole first issue about transport, because I don't think the courts will block the transport at that point. So I feel like number two --

THE COURT: Well, apparently some of the orders don't require a progress report. That's what Ms. Scott has just indicated.

MS. VETTO: I do not know that. That is not before the Court today and I don't have that information.

THE COURT: That's part of why I need this time, because there's some important questions that, through no fault of your own, none of you know the answer to yet. That's an important point. That's a very different issue if all that's being required, all is progress reports as opposed to just a pure competing set of demands against your client.

What I said earlier about the Supremacy Clause means for your client's purposes that there well may come a day, perhaps, that your clients face competing orders -- I should say irreconcilable orders. That's too bad. That's not a good situation for your clients to be in, but the Supremacy Clause does provide an answer that gives your client a clean path forward.

MS. VETTO: And we appreciate the opportunity to participate as amicus and to participate in the mediations next week and the week after. I guess my question is, it was our understanding that the mediations were geared toward proposals for amending the order. Is this part of that or is this separate from that?

THE COURT: I'll leave that to Judge Beckerman. I'm not going to step on that at all. But I am requiring, whether it's independent or folded into that, separate consideration by the parties and entities represented here today of the narrow issue that has been raised by Ms. Cooper's request.

MS. COOPER: Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. COOPER: I think your original proposal under the first -- around the proposed language clarifying the obligation to transport, plaintiffs remain open to providing that documentation within a week. We think that's more than enough time for the parties to meet and provide that clarity.

THE COURT: I think that's right. It's a much easier -- I don't mean easier intellectually, but it's a much quicker task to undertake than the rest, and it doesn't require, for example, learning facts you don't currently know.

So one week to submit proposed textual amendments that close the gap I've described, and then I'll set a date in maybe -- when is the second mediation session scheduled for?

1 The 11th? So a couple weeks after that to finish up the rest 2 of what I've requested. 3 MS. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor. I would imagine by the last week of April we will have an idea if the mediation has 4 5 been successful and language around what you've identified as to textual change, and then three, briefing regarding whether 6 7 or not a writ of mandamus is an appropriate remedy for plaintiffs. 8 9 THE COURT: Ms. Scheele, can you suggest a date? 10 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: April 25th. 11 THE COURT: I'll receive briefing on that date, and 12 then I'll set a further hearing if necessary. 13 MS. SCOTT: Your Honor, I think also within one week 14 we can provide briefing on No. 3, which is whether or not the 15 parties should appeal the state court nontransport orders. 16 THE COURT: Wonderful. I'll look forward to reading it. 17 18 Anything else, Ms. Cooper? 19 MS. COOPER: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 20 THE COURT: Ms. Scott? 21 MS. SCOTT: No, Your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: Ms. Potter? 22 23 MS. POTTER: No, Your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: Mr. Garza? 24 25 MR. GARZA: No.

THE COURT: Ms. Vetto? MS. VETTO: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you all for your assistance in this matter today. We'll be in recess. THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise. Court is in recess. (Proceedings concluded at 2:19 p.m.)

--000--I certify, by signing below, that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the record of proceedings in the above-entitled cause. A transcript without an original signature or conformed signature is not certified. /s/Bonita J. Shumway April 5, 2023 BONITA J. SHUMWAY, CSR, RMR, CRR DATE Official Court Reporter

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